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ABSTRACT
A large empirical literature has found that fiscal policy in developing countries is procyclical, in contrast
to high-income countries where it is countercyclical. The idea that fiscal policy in developing countries
is procyclical has all but reached the status of conventional wisdom. This has sparked a growing theoretical
literature that attempts to explain such a puzzle. Some authors, however, have suggested that procyclical
fiscal policy could be more fiction than truth since, by and large, the current literature has ignored
endogeneity problems and may have simply misidentified a standard expansionary effect of fiscal
policy. To settle this issue of causality, we build a novel quarterly dataset for 49 countries covering
the period 1960-2006, and subject the data to a battery of econometric tests: instrumental variables,
simultaneous equations, and time-series methods.  We find overwhelming evidence to support the
idea that procyclical fiscal policy in developing countries is in fact truth and not fiction.  We also find
evidence that fiscal policy is expansionary -- a channel disregarded by the existing literature -- lending
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Over the last 10 years, a large and growing literature has argued that
there is a fundamental di⁄erence between how ￿scal policy is conducted in
developing countries compared to industrial countries. While ￿scal policy
in industrial countries is either acyclical or countercyclical, ￿scal policy in
developing countries is, by and large, procyclical. Gavin and Perotti (1997)
were the ￿rst to call attention to the fact that ￿scal policy in Latin America
appeared to be procyclical. Talvi and VØgh (2005) then claimed that, far
from being a Latin-American phenomenon, procyclical ￿scal policy seemed
to be the rule in all of the developing world. In fact, in Talvi and VØgh￿ s
(2005) study, the correlation between the cyclical component of government
consumption and GDP is positive for each of the 36 developing countries
in their sample (with an average of 0.53). In sharp contrast, the average
correlation for G7 countries is zero. By now, a large number of authors
have reached similar conclusions to the point that the procyclicality of
￿scal policy in developing countries has become part of the conventional
wisdom.2
Perhaps the more convincing evidence that this idea has indeed become
conventional wisdom is the explosion of theoretical models trying to explain
such a puzzle. In other words, why would developing countries pursue a
procyclical ￿scal policy that might exacerbate the business cycle? An all
too brief review of the literature reveals that explanations follow two main
strands: (a) imperfections in international credit markets that prevent de-
veloping countries from borrowing in bad times (Gavin and Perotti (1997),
Riascos and VØgh (2003), Guerson (2003), Caballero and Krishnamurthy
(2004), Mendoza and Oviedo (2006), and Susuki (2006)); and (b) political
economy explanations typically based on the idea that good times encour-
age ￿scal pro￿ igacy and/or rent-seeking activities: (Tornell and Lane (1998,
1999), Talvi and VØgh (2005), Alesina and Tabellini (2005), and Ilzetzki
(2007)).
But do we really know what we think we know? Put di⁄erently, is it
really the case that government spending responds positively (in a causal
sense) to the business cycle in developing countries? While a positive cor-
relation between the cyclical component of government consumption and
GDP certainly gives no indication of causality, the literature has implicitly
assumed that the causality goes from the business cycle to ￿scal policy. But
is this a reasonable inference? No, according to the insightful comments
of Roberto Rigobon on Kaminsky, Reinhart, and VØgh (2004). In fact,
Rigobon has argued that, if anything, the structure of shocks in developing
and industrial countries is such that it is more likely that reverse causal-
2See, among others, Mailhos and Sosa (2000), Braun (2001), Sanchez de Cima (2003),
Lane (2003), Kaminsky, Reinhart, and VØgh (2004), Alesina and Tabellini (2005), Man-
asse (2006), Sturzenegger and Wernek (2006), Ilzetzki (2007), and Strawczynski and
Zeira (2007).
2ity explains the observed patterns in the data (i.e., ￿scal policy is driving
output). In a similar vein, the numerous papers that have purported to es-
tablish that ￿scal policy is procyclical by regressing some measure of ￿scal
policy on some measure of the business cycle ￿while controlling for other
factors ￿have essentially ignored the problem of endogeneity.3 What if
accounting for endogeneity were to make the procyclical results disappear?
This is precisely the argument made by Jaimovich and Panizza (2007) who
claim that, once GDP has been suitably instrumented for, causality runs in
the opposite direction (i.e., from ￿scal policy to GDP).4 But, surprisingly
enough, there is little systematic work in this area. This would seem to be a
major shortcoming, given that if ￿scal policy in developing countries is not
really procyclical, all the existing theory would be essentially irrelevant.
In addition to the obvious academic interest of this question, its rele-
vance for public policy is hard to understate. In fact, the ability to transi-
tion from a procyclical ￿scal policy to an acyclical or countercyclical policy
is viewed as a badge of macroeconomic honor in the developing world and
as a sign that the country belongs to an exclusive club that relies on sound
￿scal and monetary policies.5 If procyclical ￿scal policy just re￿ ects reverse
causality, then clearly this way of thinking would be completely unfounded.
The main purpose of this paper is thus to ask: is ￿scal policy really
procyclical in developing countries, or does causality run the other way so
that previous researchers have just misidenti￿ed a standard expansionary
(Keynesian or neoclassical) e⁄ect of ￿scal policy? To tackle this question
in depth, we turn to quarterly data (all the empirical literature in this area
has used annual data). While annual data may be su¢ cient to explore
the basic correlations and for some empirical approaches, we will see that
the identi￿cation assumptions underlying our VAR regressions are valid for
quarterly, but not annual, data. To this e⁄ect, we put together a database
with quarterly data that encompasses 49 (27 developing and 22 industrial)
countries and which, depending on the country in question, goes as far back
as 1960. After developing some simple econometric models, we subject our
data to a wide array of econometric tests aimed at disentangling causality.
While a particular methodology may not be fully convincing in and of itself,
we attempt to reach our conclusions by a preponderance of the evidence.
We thus resort to instrumental variables, GMM, simultaneous equations,
and time series techniques (Granger causality and impulse responses).6
3We note exceptions like Braun (2001), Lane (2003), Gal￿ and Perotti (2003), and
Strawczynski and Zeira (2007).
4Notice that, theoretically, ￿scal policy is expansionary in both Keynesian and neo-
classical models. In the standard neoclassical model (see, for instance, Baxter and
King (1993)), an increase in government purchases is expansionary because the negative
wealth e⁄ect reduces consumption and leisure, thus increasing labor and, by increasing
the marginal productivity of capital, investment.
5See Arellano (2006) for the case of Chile and Strawczynski and Zeira (2007) for the
case of Israel.
6As a reference point ￿and for the purposes of comparing with the existing literature
3In addition to focusing on the issue of causality, our methodology will
allow us to identify empirically a critical channel underlying this literature,
which has been entirely disregarded so far. Implicit in all the literature is
the idea that procyclical ￿scal policy is sub-optimal because it would ex-
acerbate the business cycle ￿what Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Vegh (2004)
have dubbed the ￿when it rains, it pours￿phenomenon. Clearly, if changes
in ￿scal policy did not a⁄ect output, then ￿at least from a purely macro-
economic point of view ￿procyclical ￿scal policy should not be a cause for
concern. As part of our econometric tests, we will be able to test whether
changes in government spending a⁄ect output. In other words, we will
be able to ascertain whether the when-it-rains-it-pours idea is empirically
relevant or not.
How do we proceed? After discussing some conceptual and methodolog-
ical issues in Section 2, Section 3 develops some simple empirical models
that illustrate some of the main ideas at stake and formalize the equations
that will be estimated in the following sections. Section 4 discusses our
datasets and variables of interest. Section 5 sets the empirical stage by
replicating (with quarterly data) existing results that are obtained by re-
gressing changes in (the log of) real government consumption on (the log of)
real GDP. Section 6 turns to instrumental variables as a way of dealing with
the endogeneity problem. We follow Jaimovich and Panizza (2007) in using
the weighted GDP growth of countries￿trading partners as an instrument
for GDP (and also experiment with other instruments). Unlike Jaimovich
and Panizza, however, we conclude that a simple two-stage-least-squares
approach is inconclusive and does not allow us to extract any useful conclu-
sions regarding the existence (or lack thereof) of reverse causality. Section
7 then proceeds to use GMM to estimate the same system. Here we ￿nd
strong evidence of procyclical ￿scal policy in developing countries, while
we ￿nd that ￿scal policy is acyclical in high-income countries. Section 8
estimates a simultaneous system by OLS. Here we ￿nd evidence of both
the procyclicality of ￿scal policy in developing countries and of an expan-
sionary e⁄ect of ￿scal policy. Section 9 develops our VAR estimations. For
starters, we conduct Granger causality tests that reject the hypothesis that
the business cycle does not Granger-cause government consumption. We
then show impulse responses which, again, are broadly consistent with the
idea that an output shock leads to higher government spending.
After this exhaustive battery of econometric tests, we can summarize
our results as follows:
￿ There is ample econometric evidence to indicate that procyclical ￿s-
cal policy in developing countries (de￿ned as a positive response of
government spending to an exogenous expansionary business cycle
shock) is truth and not ￿ction. GMM estimations and (OLS) simul-
taneous equations estimations, Granger-causality tests, and impulse
￿we also carry out many of the estimations using an annual dataset.
4responses all o⁄er strong support for this proposition.
￿ The econometric evidence in high-income countries is mixed, and de-
pends on the speci￿cation. While our GMM estimations would sug-
gest that ￿scal policy is acyclical in high-income countries, our OLS
and VAR estimates appear to indicate that ￿scal policy is actually
procyclical (contrary to the current conventional wisdom). While the
focus of our paper is on ￿scal policy in developing countries, our re-
sults on high-income countries suggest that further research may be
warranted on the cyclicality of government spending in the industri-
alized world.
￿ We also ￿nd evidence of an expansionary e⁄ect of ￿scal policy on
output in both developing and high income countries. The implied
￿scal multipliers peak at 0.63 for developing countries and 0.91 for
high-income countries.7 At least for developing countries, then, this
provides clear evidence that the when-it-rains-it pours phenomenon
is empirically relevant (i.e., procyclical ￿scal policy ampli￿es the un-
derlying business cycle) and should indeed be a serious public policy
concern.
2. CONCEPTUAL AND METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES
This section discusses some important methodological issues that arise
in this area.
2.1. How do we measure ￿scal policy?
Conceptually ￿and in line with Kaminsky, Reinhart, and Vegh (2004) ￿
we think that it only makes sense to measure ￿scal policy by looking at pol-
icy instruments. After all, if one is interested in macroeconomic policy, one
should focus on instruments rather than outcomes (which lie outside the
policymakers￿control). In theory, at least, the two key ￿scal policy instru-
ments are government consumption (as opposed to government spending,
which would include transfers and debt service) and tax rates (as opposed
to tax revenues, which respond endogenously to the business cycle). While
many studies in the literature look at the ￿scal de￿cit (see, for example,
Alesina, Campante, and Tabellini (2008)), we feel that this not an appro-
priate measure of ￿scal policy precisely because of the cyclicality of tax
revenues. In other words, even if ￿scal policy were completely acyclical
7The ￿gure for high income countries is roughly consistent with the estimates of 0.90
and 1.29 (depending on the methodology) for the United States reported by Blanchard
and Perotti (2002, Table 4) and somewhat higher than the estimate of 0.52 for a panel
consisting of Australia, Canada, United Kingdom, and United States reported in Ravn,
Schmitt-Grohe, and Uribe (2007).
5(i.e., even if the path of government consumption and tax rates were in-
dependent of the business cycle), the ￿scal balance would be in surplus in
good times (as the tax base expands) and in de￿cit in bad times (as the tax
base contracts). An econometrician looking at the ￿scal balance may thus
conclude that ￿scal policy is countercyclical (i.e., the government is trying
to actively smooth the business cycle) when in reality the government is
engaged in a completely neutral ￿scal policy and smoothing both govern-
ment consumption and tax rates, in the spirit of Barro￿ s (1979) neoclassical
prescriptions.
Focusing on the ￿scal balance might also lead to erroneous conclusions
when comparing the cyclicality of ￿scal policy across countries. For in-
stance, several papers conclude that ￿scal policy is more procyclical in de-
veloping countries than in industrial counties because the correlation of the
￿scal balance with the business cycle is positive in industrial countries and
less so ￿or negative ￿in developing countries (Gavin and Perotti (1997),
Alesina, Campante and Tabellini (2008)). This inference is not warranted,
however, because it might be the case that government consumption and
tax rates behave similarly but tax revenues are more procyclical in indus-
trial than in developing countries.
Since, unfortunately, there is no readily available cross-country data
on tax rates, we will restrict our attention to the spending side. While,
for the above reasons, our main focus will be on government consumption,
we will also look at overall government spending for several reasons. First,
since much of the existing literature has focused on government spending, it
provides a useful reference point. Second ￿and as discussed below ￿looking
at government spending allows us to infer something about the cyclical
behavior of transfers which, while not the main focus of this paper, provides
insights into how much governments insure the private sector against the
business cycle.
In terms of measuring government consumption, notice that if we had
a perfect price de￿ ator for government consumption, cyclical changes in
relative prices would not a⁄ect real government consumption. In practice,
of course, we do not have such re￿ned price indices and it is thus likely that
changes in relative prices do a⁄ect measured government consumption. For
instance, in developing countries the relative price of non-tradable goods
is typically procyclical. Since the public wage bill is a major component of
government consumption, de￿ ating nominal government consumption by
the CPI index will most likely imply that measured government consump-
tion increases in good times and falls in bad times.
For the purposes of this paper, and whenever available (mainly high-
income countries and large developing countries; see the data appendix
for more details), government consumption was de￿ ated using a de￿ ator
speci￿c to government consumption. Elsewhere, we had no choice but to
use the CPI index. However, in those countries where several indices were
available, all of our results were robust to using either the government
6consumption de￿ ator, the GDP de￿ ator, or the CPI index.
2.2. Breaking down government spending
For the purposes of our discussion, it proves useful to break down gov-
ernment spending as follows:
government spending = government consumption + public investment +transfers + debt service.
With this simple ￿scal accounting as background, a couple of points are
worth mentioning.8
First, notice that this breakdown does not necessarily coincide with the
one used by, for example, Gal￿ and Perotti (2003) in their study of ￿scal pol-
icy in the European Union. Their main breakdown is between cyclical (or
non-discretionary or automatic) and cyclically-adjusted (or discretionary)
government spending. They focus on the discretionary component on the
grounds that this is the better measure of the ￿scal stance. In our view,
however, the distinction between discretionary and non-discretionary is not
relevant for our purposes ￿and this seems to be the implicit stand taken
by almost all authors in this ￿eld. In other words, what matters is the ac-
tual response of government consumption to the cycle rather than whether
this response comes about as part of some explicit ￿scal policy rule (dis-
cretionary) or, say, some legal constraint that requires the government to
increase spending in some states of natures (e.g., to provide more school
lunches in bad times).
Second, while not our main focus, whenever data are available we will
check the cyclicality of public investment and debt service and use that in-
formation to infer the cyclicality of transfers. Our conjecture is, of course,
that transfers will be countercyclical (the case, for instance, of unemploy-
ment insurance or food stamp programs), particularly in industrial coun-
tries or relatively well-o⁄ developing countries with a social safety net in
place. In other words, even in cases in which ￿scal policy may not be ac-
tively used to smooth the business cycle, it is of course possible that the
government may be trying to insure the private sector from business cycle
￿ uctuations. In such a case ￿and since we ￿nd that, on average, debt
service is acyclical and public investment is procyclical ￿the acyclicality or
countercyclicality of government spending must re￿ ect the countercyclical
nature of transfers.
8It is important to keep in mind that, in country and international organizations
publications, goverment spending is often labeled di⁄erently. In IFS, for instance, it is
referred to as ￿government expenditure.￿ (The reader is referred to the data appendix
for details.)
72.3. Is it really the case that ￿when it rains, it pours￿?
As is apparent from the existing literature, the reason why ￿scal pro-
cyclicality in developing countries constitutes a puzzle in search of an ex-
planation lies in the fact that, from either a Keynesian or neoclassical
perspective, theoretical considerations clearly suggest that it cannot be op-
timal to reinforce the business cycle by expanding ￿scal policy in good
times and contracting it in bad times (i.e., what Kaminsky, Reinhart, and
Vegh (2004) have dubbed the ￿when it rains, it pours￿phenomenon).
In a Keynesian world ￿and due to sticky prices or wages ￿the economy
would not adjust immediately to its full-employment level of output in
response to output shocks. In such a model, an increase in government
consumption would increase aggregate demand and lead to higher output.
The optimal ￿scal policy is thus countercyclical. In this world, reducing
government consumption (the ￿pour￿ component) would reduce output
even further. For empirical purposes, we will capture this Keynesian world
in Models 1, 2, and 3 of next section.
In a neoclassical world, an optimal ￿scal policy would imply constant
tax rates over the business cycle in the spirit of Barro (1979). In terms
of government consumption, the optimal policy would depend on the spec-
i￿cation of the model. Clearly, if government consumption entered pref-
erences separably, then a smooth path would be optimal. On the other
hand, if government consumption were a substitute (complement) for pri-
vate consumption, then it would be optimally countercyclical (procyclical).
While, theoretically, one can indeed think of scenarios in which government
consumption could be a substitute (think of government-provided school
lunches) or complement (think of government-provided port services) to
private consumption, we believe that in practice the substitutability will
be mainly re￿ ected in transfers (food stamps, unemployment insurance)
and the complementarity in public investment (providing better roads in
good times), neither of which are part of government consumption. Hence
￿and to a ￿rst approximation ￿we will think of optimal government con-
sumption in a neo-classical world as being uncorrelated to the business
cycle. In this light, procyclical government consumption would also be
sub-optimal. A recurrent explanation in the literature for this sub-optimal
response is the presence of some political distortion, which leads to higher
government consumption as a second-best response. We will capture this
world in Model 4 below.
According to standard neo-classical theory, an increase in government
consumption would also be expansionary. Consider, for example, the model
of Baxter and King (1993). An increase in government spending leads to
a short (and long) run increase in output because the resulting negative
wealth e⁄ect induces consumer to consume less goods and less leisure (i.e.
labor supply goes up). The increase in labor supply increases the marginal
productivity of capital thus leading as well to an increase in investment.
8Our econometric results could thus be capturing either a Keynesian
or neoclassical expansionary output e⁄ect of government consumption. In
either case, however, this is evidence of a sub-optimal response. In a Keyne-
sian world, this output e⁄ect would reinforce the shock hitting the economy
and in a neoclassical world it would represent an undesirable source of out-
put ￿ uctuations. Both our simultaneous equations and VAR regressions
below will enable us to address the question of the expansionary impact of
government consumption.
3. EMPIRICAL MODELS
This section lays out some simple empirical models that will provide a
useful guide to our empirical estimations.
3.1. Model 1: A contemporaneous ￿scal rule
The simplest model to think about issues of reserve causality is the
following:
gt = ￿yt + "t; (1)
yt = ￿gt + ￿t; (2)
where gt and yt are (the cyclical components of) government spending (or
consumption) and output; ￿ (￿ R 0) and ￿ (￿ ￿ 0) are parameters; and "t
and ￿t are i.i.d shocks with mean 0 and variance ￿2
" and ￿2
￿, respectively,
and E￿t"t = 0. Equation (1) captures a ￿scal reaction function whereby
government spending responds to contemporaneous output, with the co-
e¢ cient ￿ representing the cyclical stance of ￿scal policy: if ￿ < 0, ￿scal
policy is countercyclical; if ￿ = 0, ￿scal policy is acyclical; and if ￿ > 0,
￿scal policy is procyclical. Equation (2) allows for an expansionary e⁄ect
of government consumption on output. The shocks "t and ￿t capture ￿scal
and output (productivity) shocks, respectively. We assume that j￿￿j < 1.9
We can interpret most of the current literature as having estimated
some version of equation (1). With some notable exceptions (Braun (2001),
Lane (2003), and Jaimovich and Panizza (2007)), problems related to the
endogeneity of yt have been cast aside. As Rigobon￿ s (2004) insightful
comments show, ignoring the problem of endogeneity can lead to a highly
misleading picture. To see this, solve for the reduced form of system (1)









9As can be checked, this condition ensures that the ratio ￿2
g=￿2
y is an increasing
function of the ratio ￿2
"=￿2
￿.







To ￿x ideas, suppose that there were no output shocks (i.e., ￿2







Hence, even if ￿scal policy were countercyclical (￿ < 0), the correlation
between yt and gt would be positive (as typically reported in the literature)
but the claim that this captures procyclical ￿scal policy would be clearly
false! In general ￿ and as follows from equation (5) ￿ the sign of the
covariance between yt and gt will depend on whether ￿scal or output shocks
dominate. If ￿scal shocks dominate, the covariance will be positive; if
output shocks dominate (and ￿ < 0), the covariance will be negative.
For normative purposes, suppose that we think of this model as cap-
turing a Keynesian world where yt denotes deviations of output from the
full-employment level. What does the model tell us about the desirability












Take ￿ as given. Since, by assumption, j￿￿j < 1, the range of ￿ is given
by ￿ 2 (￿1=￿;1=￿). Given that V ar(yt) is a strictly increasing function
of ￿ in the range (￿1=￿;1=￿), then a policymaker whose objective is to
minimize the variance of output will set a negative value of ￿ such that








An acyclical policy (￿ = 0) would imply that V ar(yt) = ￿2
￿ and any pro-
cyclical ￿scal policy would imply that V ar(yt) > ￿2
￿. This simple model
thus rationalizes the idea that procyclical ￿scal policy in developing coun-
tries is a puzzle to the extent that a countercyclical policy would be more
e⁄ective in stabilizing (i.e., reducing the variability of) output.
Notice, incidentally, that countercyclical ￿scal policy is optimal only if
government spending impacts output (i.e., ￿ > 0, which implies that the
when-it-rains-it-pours channel is present). If ￿ = 0, then ￿scal policy is
irrelevant and the procyclicality discussion would be devoid of macroeco-
nomic policy implications.
10Naturally, from an econometric point of view, equation (1) cannot be
estimated by OLS because the covariance between yt and "t is not zero.





" > 0. (7)
We will therefore proceed in the following way. In Section 6, we will esti-
mate equation (1) by instrumental variables. As instruments for output, we
will use the weighted growth of countries￿trading partners and lagged-GDP
growth. In Section 7, we use these same instruments ￿and, in addition,
the real interest rate on U.S. treasury bills ￿to estimate equations (1) and
(2) as a system of simultaneous equations using GMM.10
Finally, notice that since the model assumes in equation (1) that govern-
ment spending (the policy instrument) reacts to contemporaneous output,
it may be argued that this model would ￿t better annual rather than quar-
terly data. (We will estimate the model using data at both frequencies to
compare results.) When thinking about quarterly data, the next model
looks, in principle, more appropriate.
3.2. Model 2: A lagged ￿scal rule
Suppose now that (a) government spending responds to lagged, rather
than contemporaneous, output and (b) output is determined by lagged
output and government spending:
gt = ￿yt￿1 + "t; (8)
yt = ￿yt￿1 + ￿gt + ￿t; (9)
where "t and ￿t are i.i.d with mean zero and variance ￿2
" and ￿2
￿, respec-
tively, and E￿t"t = 0.
Substituting (8) into (9), we obtain
yt = (￿ + ￿￿)yt￿1 + ￿t; (10)






10We exploit that fact that, unlike Jaimovich and Panizza (2007), our system is overi-
denti￿ed, allowing us to estimate all structural parameters. We also improve on their
results by using a GMM estimator. The 2-stage-least-squares estimator is a special case
of the GMM estimator, but not the most e¢ cient. We estimate the variance-covarience
matrix of the system using the method of Newey and West (1987), which takes into ac-






1 ￿ (￿ + ￿￿)
2:
Suppose that the policymaker￿ s objective is to minimize output variability
for given values of ￿ and ￿.11 This is tantamount to maximizing 1 ￿
(￿ + ￿￿)






By implementing this optimum, the variance of output is reduced to ￿2
￿.
An acyclical or procyclical policy is clearly suboptimal. Intuitively, sup-
pose that there is a negative shock to output. If ￿scal policy is neutral (i.e.,
acyclical), the autoregressive structure implies that output will be persis-
tently low for a while. But if ￿scal policy is countercyclical, the increase in
g will partly o⁄set the fall in output.
From an econometric point of view, notice that equations (8) and (9)
can be estimated by OLS since
E("tyt￿1) = 0;
E (￿tyt￿1) = 0;
E (￿tgt) = 0:
We will estimate this system for quarterly data in Section 7.
3.3. Model 3: An expectational ￿scal rule
Now assume yet another ￿and highly plausible ￿￿scal rule, in which
current government spending responds to the expectation of yt conditional
on yt￿1 and gt. The idea is that since policymakers cannot observe today￿ s
output, they use their best forecast of today￿ s output in order to set ￿scal
policy. Formally:
gt = ￿E [ytj￿t] + "t; (11)
where E [ytj￿t] denotes the expected value of yt conditional on the informa-
tion set ￿t which, by assumption, contains lagged output and contempora-
neous government spending (i.e., ￿t = fyt￿1, gtg). The output equation is
still given by (9), and we continue to assume that ￿+￿￿ < 1 and j￿￿j < 1.
If expectations are rational, E [ytj￿t] will be computed using the true
model. Using (9), it follows that
E [ytj￿t] = ￿yt￿1 + ￿gt. (12)
11As in model 1, notice that if ￿ = 0, then ￿scal policy cannot a⁄ect the variability
of output and the issue of optimal ￿scal policy becomes moot.








The equations to be estimated would then be (9) and (13). While these
equations are econometrically the same as those to be estimated for Model
2 ￿given by (8) and (9) ￿in this case the coe¢ cient on yt￿1 does not
capture ￿. To recover ￿, we need to compute the following (denoting by ~ ￿
the coe¢ cient on yt￿1 in equation (13)):
￿ =
~ ￿
￿ + ￿~ ￿
.
In sum, the coe¢ cient ￿ (which captures the stance of ￿scal policy) will
di⁄er between Models 2 and Model 3. But note that ￿ > 0 if and only if
~ ￿ > 0; so our conclusions regarding the cyclicality of ￿scal policy would be
the same with both models.
Assuming again that this model captures a Keynesian world, what is





















It is easy to check that V ar(yt) is a strictly increasing function of ￿. Hence,
the optimal ￿scal policy will be to set a value of ￿ as low as possible; that
is, ￿ ! ￿1=￿, which implies that ￿￿ ! ￿1.
3.4. Model 4: A political economy model
Since there are several political economy explanations of procyclical
￿scal policy in the literature (Tornell and Lane (1998, 1999), Talvi and
VØgh (2005), Alesina, Campante, and Tabellini (2008), and Ilzetzki (2007)),
it will prove helpful to reinterpret a slight variation of Model 1 along such
lines. While the various models di⁄er in the details, the basic idea is that
￿scal surpluses are ￿bad￿in the sense that they generate political pressures
or rent-seeking activities that tend to increase spending in good times.
To capture this scenario, let the primary surplus be given by
13St ￿ ￿yt ￿ gt; (14)
where ￿yt are tax revenues, which are assumed to be proportional to output.
In turn, government spending is given by
gt = ￿ g + ￿St + "t, (15)
where ￿ g is the (exogenously-given) level of government spending in the
absence of any political distortion and ￿ denotes the magnitude of the












The second equation in this model would remain unchanged (relative to
Model 1) and remain given by equation (2).
The system to be estimated (given by equations (2) and (16)) would be
the same as in Model 1 but, of course, the interpretation of the coe¢ cient on
y in equation (16) would be di⁄erent. While we cannot ￿identify￿￿, if the
estimated coe¢ cient is positive we would infer that ￿ > 0 since, in practice,
￿ > 0.12 A positive coe¢ cient would thus be interpreted as evidence of a
￿political distortion￿and a positive ￿ as evidence of an expansionary e⁄ect
of government consumption.13
3.5. Model 5: A simple VAR
3.5.1. Set-up
In Model 2, we assume that output follows an AR(1) process and that
government consumption can only respond to output with a one-quarter
lag. A natural extension is to allow for both output and government con-
sumption to follow a vector-autoregressive process including more lags. In




CkYt￿k + But; (17)





includes the two variables of interest. The
2x2 matrix Ck estimates the own- and cross-e⁄ects of the kth lag of the
the variables on their current observation. The matrix B is diagonal, so
12See, for example, Ilzetzki (2007) and Talvi and Vegh (2005). The latter ￿nd a
correlation of 0.47 between (the cyclical components of) GDP and tax revenues in a
sample of 56 countries (industrial and developing).
13Notice, of course, that the question of what would the optimal value of ￿ be does
not apply since, by construction, ￿, is capturing some pre-existing political distortion.
14that the vector ut is a vector of orthogonal, i.i.d. shocks to government
consumption and output. Finally, the matrix A allows for the possibility
of simultaneous e⁄ects between gt and yt.
To ￿x ideas, notice that Model 2 is, in fact, a particular case of (17).













with a21 = ￿￿. Then, the system (17) is identical to the one given by (8)
and (9). Following Blanchard and Perotti (2002), the assumption that in
the matrix A, a12 = 0 (re￿ ecting the assumption that yt does not a⁄ect gt)
is common in the VAR estimates of the e⁄ectiveness of ￿scal policy.
3.5.2. Impulse Responses
In order to compare our VAR results with the results from our OLS, IV,
and GMM regressions, we need to be careful in interpreting the impulse
responses.14
The impulse response of g to an output shock, ￿, after one quarter is
de￿ned as @gt+1=@￿t. Leading (8) and then substituting (9) into (8), we
obtain:





In other words, the impulse response function (one period out, in the
VAR(1) system described above) captures precisely the coe¢ cient of the
￿scal reaction function. The impulse response in period two (given by
@gt+2=@￿t), however, is a complicated function of the structural parame-










= ￿￿ + ￿
2￿. (19)
This gives us the full dynamic response of g to the output shock two periods
following a shock, which comprises the following two factors:
14While the logic that follows is not new (see, for instance, Blinder (2004)), it is worth
spelling it out in the context of our particular application.
151. The ￿scal ￿policy rule￿response to additional changes in output in
the following period due to the autoregressive process that output
follows (￿￿).
2. The second-order e⁄ect of the ￿scal policy rule￿ s response to the ￿scal






Note that there is no direct e⁄ect of the output shock on government
consumption through the ￿scal policy rule in (19), stemming from our
assumption that the system is VAR(1). Fiscal policy￿ s direct response to
the ￿t shock already occurred in the ￿rst period. If we wanted to capture
this entire e⁄ect, we would look at the cumulative impulse response function






= ￿ + ￿￿ + ￿
2￿.
However ￿and to conserve space ￿we will not be plotting the cumulative
e⁄ect. The second value of our impulse responses will therefore correspond
to (19).15
3.5.3. Interpretation
As equation (1) makes clear, when we perform IV/GMM estimations
and estimate the parameter ￿, we are measuring how government consump-
tion reacts contemporaneously to all output movements, whether antici-
pated or not. In other words, IV/GMM estimations are able to address the
issue of causality but not of forecastability since, by de￿nition, we would not
be able to forecast an unanticipated shock to output and hence the ￿scal re-
sponse. In contrast, in the VAR estimations, we will be isolating the e⁄ects
of unanticipated output shocks on government consumption. As discussed
in McCallum (1999), whether this particular exercise is valuable depends
on the importance of unanticipated output shocks for government con-
sumption compared to the e⁄ects of systematic (i.e., forecastable) changes
in output. Since this is clearly an open question at this point, we remain
agnostic on this issue and choose to use di⁄erent techniques that allow us
to investigate the e⁄ects on government consumption of both forecastable
and unforecastable changes in output.
15Needless to say, comparisons between the impulse responses and the other regressions
will be further complicated by the fact that we are running a VARs with more lags than a
VAR(1), for which all the above analysis is given. With a VAR(T) (T>3), the 4-quarter
lagged impluse response of g to ￿ (@gt+4=@￿t) is a complex formula including ￿1:::￿4,
￿1:::￿3 and ￿1:::￿3. But the key message remains the same: the impulse response in the
￿rst period out captures ￿, whereas all ensuing values capture a complicated combination
of structural parameters.
164. THE DATA
In order to carefully explore the question of ￿scal cyclicality, we em-
ploy a data set of quarterly frequency, including government spending,
business cycle, and control variables. A detailed description of the data
appears in Appendix 1. The data comprises 27 developing countries and
22 high-income countries. Income groupings are primarily based on the
World Bank￿ s classi￿cation in 2006.16 To ensure the integrity of quarterly
data, only developing countries who subscribe to the International Mon-
etary Fund￿ s (IMF￿ s) Special Data Dissemination Standard are included.
Only those years for which data was originally collected at quarterly fre-
quency are studied, and countries with less than 8 years (32 quarters) of
data have been excluded. The coverage spans from as early as Q1 of 1960
to as late as Q4 of 2006, but varies from country to country. Similar results
obtain when a balanced panel including the quarters 1996Q1 to 2006Q3 is
used. The main data source is the IMF￿ s International Financial Statistics
(IFS) database; we used national sources as well as the database of Agenor
et al (2000) to expand the coverage.
The main variables of interest in exploring the cyclicality of ￿scal policy
are real central government spending, real general government consump-
tion, and real GDP. As mentioned earlier, an exploration of the cyclicality
of ￿scal policy should focus on indicators that are under direct control of
the ￿scal authorities: government spending and tax rates. Since time series
on tax rates are available for only a small number of countries, we focus on
government spending. The main results will be for the behavior of real gen-
eral government consumption. For comparison, we will occasionally report
results using central government real total spending as the ￿scal measure.
Estimations are less precise when using government spending since fewer
countries report this measure on a quarterly basis.17 Also, the overlap be-
tween quarterly measures of total spending of the central government and
GDP include very short time series for a number of countries.
There is a trade-o⁄ in the choice of the government spending measure.
While the use of a general government measure is more inclusive, including
both central and local governments, the use of central government spend-
ing is more in accordance with the principle of looking at ￿scal policy
instruments that are directly under the control of a single ￿scal agent. On
the other hand, total central government spending includes more spending
16Israel was classi￿ed as a high-income country in 2006, but was a developing country
for some of the sample period. Korea graduated into the high-income category in 2001.
The Czech Republic became a high-income country in 2007. We classify these three
countries as "developing" since they met this criterion for much of the sample. The
exclusion of these three countries from the developing country sample or inclusion in the
high-income sample does not alter our results.
17In fact, the problem is more accute for high-income countries than for develop-
ing countries, as many European Union countries stopped reporting this measure on a
quarterly basis in the mid-1990s.
17categories, such as government investment and transfers, but also interest
payments, which makes this measure more noisy. Much of the literature
on the cyclicality of ￿scal policy has used real central government spending
(e.g. Kaminsky, Reinhart and VØgh (2004), and Alesina, Campante and
Tabellini (2008)), while much of the literature on the e⁄ectiveness of ￿scal
policy in high-income countries has looked at government consumption or
a combination of government consumption and investment (e.g. Blanchard
and Perotti (2002), and Perotti (2004)).
4.1. Variables of interest
Indices of real government spending and real government consumption
are created as follows. We obtain real data directly from national sources,
whenever available. For the remaining countries, we de￿ ate nominal gov-
ernment spending measures with the consumer price index (CPI). Nominal
government spending variables, normalized to one in a base quarter, are
de￿ ated using a CPI index with a similar base year. Measures of real
government spending and consumption de￿ ated by the CPI, the GDP de-
￿ ator, or reported directly from national sources are highly correlated for
countries where more than one of these variables are available.
Real gross domestic product is taken directly from national accounts.
As additional controls and instruments, we include exogenous shocks
that may drive the business cycle. We instrument GDP with international
￿nancial conditions using a measure of global interest rates. Speci￿cally,
we use the real return on 6-month Treasury bills.18 This interest rate is
weighted for each country based on its degree of ￿nancial openness. We
scale the interest rate using the measure of Chinn and Ito (2007), rescaled to
range between 0 and 1 and averaged over the relevant sample for each coun-
try (giving one index of ￿nancial openness per country). As in Jaimovich
and Panizza (2007), we also use an instrument representing real external
shocks, using an index of the real GDP growth of each country￿ s trading
partners. The construction of this variable is discussed in Appendix 1.
All series (except for interest rates) are in logs and, when not reported
in seasonally-adjusted terms, seasonally-adjusted using the X-11 algorithm.
Seasonally adjusting the data using seasonal dummies yields similar results.
4.2. Annual data
For estimations at the annual frequency, we use the dataset of Kamin-
sky, Reinhart, and VØgh (2004). The data sources are di⁄erent (primarily
the IMF￿ s World Economic Outlook). A detailed description of the data
can be found in Kaminsky, Reinhart and VØgh (2004). The sample of coun-
tries (21 high-income and 81 developing countries) and years (1961-2003)
18We use an adaptive-expectations measure of real interest rates. Results are identical
with an ex-post measure of real interest rates.
18is larger. We sacri￿ced consistency of data sources between the quarterly
and annual samples for the sake of a larger sample size.
5. STYLIZED FACTS
Table 1 presents the basic stylized facts of our quarterly sample. The
table presents regressions of (changes in the logs of) measures of real govern-
ment spending against GDP. Results are of panel regressions with country
￿xed e⁄ects. The ￿rst column revisits the familiar stylized fact that gov-
ernment spending is procyclical in developing countries, regardless of the
spending measure studied. The results are statistically signi￿cant at the 99
percent con￿dence level. The second column presents the results of similar
regressions for high-income countries. While government consumption is
mildly procyclical, it is far less procyclical than in developing countries.
We can reject at the 99 percent con￿dence level that the coe¢ cient is the
same for the two income groups. Total government spending, on the other
hand, is acyclical. The estimation is, however, very imprecise, due to the
smaller sample size. Appendix Table A1 repeats the OLS regression for
government spending, using industrial production as a proxy for output.
This increases our sample size. The estimated parameters are virtually
unchanged, but we can reject at the 99 percent con￿dence level that the
cyclicality of government spending in the two income groups is the same.
Table 2 shows similar results using annual data. All measures of gov-
ernment spending are highly procyclical in developing countries. In high-
income countries, total government spending is acyclical, but government
consumption and investment are procyclical. The main di⁄erence be-
tween high-income countries and developing countries is in total govern-
ment spending, where we can establish that government spending is more
procyclical in developing countries (with 99 percent con￿dence). There is
no statistically signi￿cant di⁄erence between the other measures in high-
income and developing countries.
In the last row of this table, we provide evidence of the acyclicality
of interest payments, in both income categories. This indicates that the
cyclicality of debt service is not driving the cyclicality of total government
spending. We conjecture that, in high-income countries, government spend-
ing is less countercyclical than government consumption largely because of
transfers (i.e., the automatic stabilizers that are in place in high-income
countries).
In summary, a basic OLS regression recon￿rms that government con-
sumption and total spending are procyclical in developing countries. In
high income countries, government consumption is procyclical but govern-
ment spending is acyclical. With quarterly data, we can reject the hypoth-
esis that the cyclicality of government spending and consumption is the
same in the two income groups.
196. A TWO-STAGE-LEAST-SQUARES APPROACH
We now turn to the question of causality. Is ￿scal policy procyclical in
developing countries, or is reverse causality driving these results? A natural
approach is a two-stage-least-squares (2SLS) regression. Such an approach
has been suggested by Rigobon (2004) and Jaimovich and Panizza (2007).
We ￿rst conduct a similar exercise as in Jaimovich and Panizza (2007),
using our quarterly data set. In a panel regression, with country ￿xed
e⁄ects, we regress the change in (log) real government consumption on the
change in (log) real GDP, where the latter is instrumented for using the
contemporaneous value and three lags of the weighted GDP growth of each
country￿ s trading partners. In e⁄ect, we are estimating ￿ in equation (1),
using 2SLS to correct for the potential bias suggested by (7).
Jaimovich and Panizza (2007) argue that this instrument is valid. Trad-
ing partners￿growth measure is correlated with output. There is no a priori
reason to suspect that external trade shocks have an e⁄ect on government
spending except through the business cycle channel. Finally, it is unlikely
that government spending of smaller economies has an e⁄ect on the growth
rates of their trading partners, which include mainly larger economies. This
latter critique may be valid for the larger economies in the sample, so that
our results for high-income countries should be taken with a grain of salt.
The results are summarized in Table 3. The OLS regressions, shown in
the ￿rst row of the table, repeat the second row of Table 1. Real govern-
ment consumption is procyclical in both income groups, but far more so in
developing countries. The second row reports the results of the 2SLS regres-
sion. Standard errors are in parenthesis and F-statistics for the ￿rst stage
regressions are in brackets. While the point estimate for the cyclicality of
government consumption in developing countries is similar to that of the
OLS regression, the results are inconclusive. Like in Jaimovich and Panizza
(2007), the standard errors of the 2SLS estimates are large and the 2SLS
estimate is not statistically distinguishable from the OLS estimate. We
cannot reject that government consumption is highly procyclical, acyclical,
or even countercyclical in developing countries. In contrast to Jaimovich
and Panizza (2007), we cannot reject that the instrument we are using is
a weak instrument, based on the test proposed by Stock and Yogo (2002).
For sake of comparison, we recreate Jaimovich and Panizza￿ s (2007) re-
sult in Table A2, using annual data. Table A3 reports results of regressions
using quarterly data, with total central government spending as the ￿scal
variable, which provides the quarterly-frequency analog of Jaimovich and
Panizza￿ s (2007) annual regressions. In both cases, the estimates are too
imprecise to make robust inferences about the cyclicality of ￿scal policy.
Jaimovich and Panizza (2007) put forth these inconclusive estimates
as evidence that previous estimates of the cyclicality of ￿scal policy are
driven by reverse causality. In contrast, we view these inconclusive results
more literally. As we will see in the following sections, using quarterly data
20and di⁄erent choices of instruments and estimation strategies yields more
precise estimates, allowing us to make more accurate inferences regarding
the cyclicality of ￿scal policy.
In order to compare Jaimovich and Panizza￿ s (2007) results with some
of the other results obtained in the literature, we report in Table A4 an es-
timation using an alternative instrument. We use GDP growth in year t￿1
as an instrument for growth in year t. This estimation strategy has been
used in this context by Braun (2001), Gal￿ and Perotti (2003), and Lane
(2003). With this 2SLS strategy, our ￿nding of procyclical government
spending in developing countries and acyclical spending in high-income
countries are robust to an instrumental-variables estimation. Similar re-
sults obtain when lagged GDP growth and the weighted GDP growth of
each country￿ s trading partners are both used as instruments. It should
be noted, however, that the strong serial correlation of GDP may make
lagged-GDP an imperfect instrument, as GDP at time t ￿ 1 may still be
correlated with the error term at time t.
In summary, the results using instrumental variables regressions give
mixed results, either providing support for the notion that ￿scal policy is
procyclical in developing countries or inconclusive results. The following
section attempts to provide more robust evidence.
7. GMM
We now propose an alternative estimation strategy, which uses a GMM
estimator. To formalize our estimation strategy, consider the estimation of
equation (1) using panel data:
gi;t = ￿1 + ￿yi;t + "1i;t; (20)
where yi;t is the output of country i in quarter t, gi;t is real government
consumption, and ￿ is the parameter of interest, which re￿ ects the cycli-
cality of government consumption. Tables 1 and 2 estimate (20) using OLS
regressions and ￿nd that government consumption is procyclical in devel-
oping countries. However, as (7) indicates, this estimate may be biased.
The typical procedure to correct for this bias when estimating the pa-
rameter ￿ is to ￿nd a set of instrumental variables Z that are correlated
with y, but such that EZj;i;t"1i;t = 0, where Zj;i;t is the tth observation
on instrumental variable j for country i. This is precisely the strategy
employed in the previous section, in Braun (2001), Lane (2003), Gal￿ and
Perotti (2003), and Jaimovich and Panizza (2007).
We propose two improvements on the methodology of the previous sec-
tion. First, we include an additional instrumental variable. Since the 2SLS
estimate of the previous section was ine¢ cient, in the sense that it provided
estimates with very large standard errors, e¢ ciency may be improved by
including an additional valid instrument. The instrument we propose is the
21real interest rate on six-month U.S. Treasury bills, weighted by a country-
speci￿c measure of ￿nancial openness. We use this as a measure of global
liquidity conditions. A natural criticism of this instrument is that it might
be endogenous in the case of the United States. To address this concern,
all regressions reported in this section exclude the U.S. Results are virtu-
ally unchanged when the U.S. is included, or when all G7 countries are
excluded.
A second improvement concerns the choice of estimator. It is well known
that a 2SLS estimator is not the most e¢ cient estimator in the class of
IV estimators. Speci￿cally, the 2SLS estimator is a special case of the
GMM estimator, with the limitation that the variance-covariance matrix
is restricted to be diagonal. Since heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation
are both distinct possibilities in a dynamic panel of the sort used here,
the 2SLS estimator is asymptotically less e¢ cient than a more generalized
GMM estimator. In our GMM estimations, we use a Newey-West (1987)
estimate of the covariance matrix, which addresses both heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelation.
The GMM estimates in quarterly frequency are summarized in Table
4, with the OLS estimates presented for comparison. Table 4 shows esti-
mates for the cyclicality of government consumption ￿￿ in the discussion
above. In developing countries, government consumption is procyclical,
with a similar point estimate as in the OLS regression. We can reject with
95 percent con￿dence that government consumption is acyclical or counter-
cyclical. We can also reject with 95 percent con￿dence that the estimates
for high-income and developing countries are the same. From the results
for high-income countries, we conclude that the 95 percent con￿dence in-
terval is [0.13, -0.35], indicating that government consumption is either
countercyclical or mildly procyclical.
Both changes with respect to the speci￿cation of the previous section are
important in improving the e¢ ciency of our estimates. Appendix Table A5
shows 2SLS estimates using the same two instruments. While the results
are similar, the estimates are less precise, and we can reject only at the
90 percent con￿dence level that government consumption is acyclical in
developing countries.
In Table A6, we repeat the same exercise using the annual sample.
In this case, the standard errors remain very large, making it di¢ cult to
draw inferences on the cyclicality of government consumption in developing
countries. On the other hand, these estimates do provide some evidence
that government consumption may be countercyclical at annual frequencies
in high income countries.
8. SIMULTANEOUS EQUATIONS ￿OLS
In Section 3, we proposed two models of the simultaneous interactions
between government consumption and output. In the previous two sections,
22we estimated the ￿rst model (Model 1), which assumed that government
consumption responds to output within the same period. As we suggested,
this approach makes sense with either annual data or with quarterly data
to the extent that government spending can react to business cycle con-
ditions within a quarter (if, for example, there is some form of automatic
stabilization).
In this section, we estimate Model 2. We assume that government
consumption can only respond to business-cycle conditions with a one-
quarter lag. This is similar to the identifying assumption in Blanchard
and Perotti (2002), which we use in the VAR estimations of the following
section. We estimate equations (8) and (9), using OLS with ￿xed e⁄ects.
As indicated in section 3, and unlike Model 1, OLS is not a biased estimator
of Model 2.
The results are summarized in Table 5. Government consumption shows
a highly-statistically-signi￿cant procyclical reaction (with a one-quarter
lag) to output. There is also evidence that, in developing countries, gov-
ernment consumption has an expansionary e⁄ect on output.
9. A VAR APPROACH
We now turn to a time series analysis. We conduct panel vector autore-
gressions in an attempt to obtain further evidence on the reaction of ￿scal





CkYi;t￿k + Bui;t; (21)
where Yi;t is a vector of variables, reported for country i at quarter t. The
vector Y includes the cyclical components of real government consumption
and real GDP, as well as additional variables. Cyclical components are
measured as deviations from the linear-quadratic trend. We run bivari-
ate regressions, in which the vector Y includes only the two endogenous
variables of main interest. This speci￿cation is helpful since in some cases
the two main variables are available for longer horizons than the other
variables. This is also closer to the simple speci￿cation in Blanchard and
Perotti (2002). In separate regressions ￿and for comparison purposes ￿we
also control for the real return on 6-month U.S. Treasuries and the weighted
growth of each country￿ s trading partners.
The matrix Ck measures the response of the variables, Y , to a k-quarter
lagged change in the model￿ s variables. For example, the appropriate el-
ement of the matrix Ck will be an estimate of the lagged ￿scal policy
response (in terms of government consumption) to changes in GDP. The
term "i;t = A￿1Bui;t is a vector of error terms re￿ ecting one-period fore-
cast errors of Y . As is common, we decompose this error term into a vector
23of structural shocks ui;t. The matrix B is assumed to be diagonal, so that
each structural shock has a direct e⁄ect on only one variable in Y . How-
ever, the matrix A re￿ ects contemporaneous e⁄ects of the variables on one
another.
We estimate (21) in the two speci￿cations described (￿bivariate￿and
￿full￿ , the latter with additional controls). In each case, the number of
included lags (ranging from 1 to 8 quarters) was determined based on the
Schwartz information criterion. The choice of lags does not a⁄ect the re-
sults. We also included country ￿xed e⁄ects.19
9.1. Granger causality
We begin our time series analysis by conducting a Granger causality
test of the two variables of interest. Table 6 reports these results. The top
panel presents results for developing countries and the bottom for high-
income countries. We report the results of Wald tests for the exclusion of
lags of real GDP from the regression where real government consumption
is the dependent variable and conversely for the exclusion of lags of real
government consumption from the real GDP regression.
A robust result emerging from the test is that we can reject at the
99 percent con￿dence level for both income groups the null that the busi-
ness cycle does not Granger-cause government consumption. Meanwhile,
the null that government consumption does not Granger cause GDP is re-
jected only in the full speci￿cation for high income countries. This provides
evidence that the co-movement of these two variables is likely due to a pol-
icy response, rather than a reverse e⁄ect of government consumption on
output.
9.2. Impulse responses
The system described by (21) is under-identi￿ed without further as-
sumptions about the matrix A. We make the following identifying assump-
tions:
1. Government consumption requires at least one quarter to respond to
GDP (and other variables). This assumption, whose logic is founded
on the fact that ￿scal policy has inherent implementation lags, follows
Blanchard and Perotti (2002).20
19As Nickell (1981) has suggested, dynamic models with ￿xed e⁄ects may provide
biased estimates. While this bias cannot be dismissed entirely for dynamic panels with
short time series, Judson and Owen (1999) estimate that a VAR based on OLS with cross-
sectional dummy variables provides less biased estimates than Arellano-Bond (1991)
type estimators, in unbalanced panels with at least 30 longitudinal observations. This
condition is met for all countries in our sample.
20Notice that this identifying assumption is not necessarily inconsistent with the GMM
results of Table 4 since in that case the contemporaneous impact of output on government
spending captures both anticipated and unanticipated changes in output whereas in the
242. As before, we assume that the real interest rate on 6-month U.S.
Treasuries and the weighted growth of countries￿trading partners
cannot be a⁄ected by other variables (or each other). We exclude the
U.S. from the high-income country sample to make the exogeneity of
these variables more plausible in this income group.
The estimated impulse responses for developing countries are shown in
Figures 1-2. Dotted lines re￿ ect two-standard-deviation bands. Figures
1 and 2 present the responses of GDP and government consumption, re-
spectively, to a 10 percent impulse to the two variables. In Figure 1, a 10
percent positive shock to government consumption leads to a statistically
signi￿cant e⁄ect on output of about 0.96 percent on impact and a peak
e⁄ect in quarter 3 of 1.1 percent. Given an average share of government
consumption in GDP in our sample of developing countries of 17.4 percent,
these ￿gures translate into multipliers of 0.55 on impact and 0.63 at the
peak. On the other hand, Figure 2 shows that a 10 percent shock to GDP
leads to an increase of around 3 percent in government consumption after
two quarters. We thus see evidence of both procyclical government con-
sumption and an expansionary e⁄ect of ￿scal policy. Taken together, these
e⁄ects imply that procyclical ￿scal policy tends to reinforce the underlying
business cycle.
Our identifying assumption relies on the fact that government consump-
tion cannot respond contemporaneously to shocks. The same identifying
assumption is not valid for total government spending, since this variable
also includes automatic stabilizers, which may respond to business cycle
shocks within the same quarter. It is nevertheless interesting to observe in
Figures A1-A4 that the result regarding the procyclicality of government
consumption in developing countries carries over to total government ex-
penditure. This result holds regardless of whether government spending
(Figures A1-A2) or GDP (Figures A3-A4) is ordered ￿rst.
Figures A5 and A6 show impulse responses of GDP and government con-
sumption, respectively, in a VAR regression when the additional variables
are included. The results obtained before are robust to these additional
variables. Government consumption shows a sizable procyclical response
to GDP and to trading partners￿GDP and a negative response to increases
in global borrowing rates.
Figures 3 and 4 repeat the exercise for high-income countries. Figure 3
shows that a 10 percent shock to government consumption leads to a signif-
icant output e⁄ect on impact of 0.72 percent and to a peak e⁄ect in quarter
9 of 1.7 percent. Given an average ratio of government consumption to
GDP in our sample of high income countries of 18.6 percent, these ￿gures
VAR case the contemporaneous e⁄ect refers only to unanticipated changes. In other
words, it seems plausible to argue that while anticipated changes in output can a⁄ect
government spending contemporaneously (through ￿scal rules), unanticipated changes
cannot (due to implementation lags).
25translate into multipliers of 0.39 on impact and 0.91 at the peak. At the
same time a 10 percent shock to GDP does not appear to have a statisti-
cally signi￿cant e⁄ect on government consumption in the ￿rst four quarters
following the shock. In the long term, however, government consumption
does increase by close to 5 percent. This medium-term procyclicality of
government consumption has been observed elsewhere (see Ravn and Si-
monelli (2007), ￿gure 1-A for example).21 Thus government consumption
shows a procyclical response with long delays.
Figures A7-A10 present the results of a VAR regression with total gov-
ernment spending instead of government consumption. An interesting con-
trast emerges: regardless of the ordering of the variables, total government
spending appears to respond countercyclically to output shocks.
Finally, ￿gures A11 and A12 show the results for high-income countries
of regressions with additional control variables. The results of ￿gures 3 and
4 remain unchanged.
10. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has used a novel quarterly data set comprising 49 coun-
tries and spanning the period 1960-2006 to analyze whether the positive
correlation between (the cyclical components of) government consumption
and output commonly identi￿ed in the literature does indeed capture pro-
cyclical ￿scal policy (i.e., a causal e⁄ect of output on government spend-
ing) or instead re￿ ects reverse causality (i.e., a causal e⁄ect of government
consumption on output). We have used various econometric methods to
address this issue: instrumental variables, GMM, OLS estimation of simul-
taneous equations, Granger causality tests, and impulse responses from an
estimated VAR.
We ￿nd overwhelming support for the existence, in developing countries,
of a causal relation from output to government consumption. Our analysis
thus leaves no doubt that ￿scal policy is indeed procyclical in developing
countries. Interestingly enough ￿and contrary to the typical ￿nding in
the literature ￿we also ￿nd substantial evidence of procyclicality in high-
income countries.
Moreover, by taking into account possible reserve causality, we have
also identi￿ed a signi￿cant expansionary e⁄ect of government consumption
on output in developing countries (a channel that has been disregarded
so far in the literature). This provides empirical support for the when-it-
rains-it-pours hypothesis: procyclical government consumption in develop-
ing countries implies that ￿scal policy exacerbates the business cycle. We
also ￿nd some support for this channel in high-income countries.
21Figure 1-A in Ravn and Simonelli (2007) in fact shows the impulse response of
government consumption to a TFP shock, while here the shock is to GDP. Still, the
results are qualititively similar.
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11. DATA APPENDIX
The annual sample uses the dataset of Kaminsky, Reinhart and VØgh
(2004). A detailed description of the data is therein.
The countries are included in the quarterly sample and the length of the
time series for each country are provided in Table A7. Developing countries
are in italics.
Following is a description of series and data sources:
Real GDP
For high-income countries, OECD developing countries, and Brazil,
South Africa and Russia, real GDP was taken from OECD series CMPGDP
VIXOBSA. This a seasonally adjusted index of real GDP, reported at quar-
terly frequency by national sources, in real local currency units. Real, sea-
sonally adjusted GDP for Ecuador was obtained from the Central Bank
of Ecuador. Industrial production was used as a proxy for real GDP in
Uganda, and was obtained from the Bank of Uganda. For Chile and India,
industrial production (see below) was used as a proxy for real GDP to ex-
pand the sample size. None of the paper￿ s results are altered if real GDP
from the IFS is used instead. For other countries, IFS series 99B.PZF was
used. Non-seasonally adjusted series were de-seasonalized using the X-11
algorithm.
Industrial Production
IFS series 66 was the main data source. The series was normalized to
1 for 1Q2000. Real GDP (see above) was used. Data for South Africa was
obtained from the national statistical agency. Series were de-seasonalized




For high-income countries and OECD developing countries, and Brazil,
India, South Africa and Russia, real government consumption was taken
from the OECD series for Government Final Consumption Expenditure,
using a real index. Real government consumption for Argentina was taken
from MECON, and for Chile, Ecuador, Israel and Venezuela from their re-
spective central banks. Data for Ecuador and Israel was seasonally-adjusted
30by the central banks. Civilian government consumption was used for Israel.
Venezuela￿ s data on public consumption di⁄ers from other countries in that
it includes government investment. We nevertheless leave Venezuela￿ s data
as reported. Excluding Venezuela from the sample does not impact any
of the paper￿ s results. Nominal government consumption for Uganda was
obtained from the Central Bank of Uganda. For other countries, IFS se-
ries 91F..ZF (nominal government consumption) was used. All nominal
series were de￿ ated using CPI. De￿ ating the series by the GDP de￿ ator
does not a⁄ect the paper￿ s results. Non-seasonally adjusted series were
de-seasonalized using the X-11 algorithm.
Real Government Spending
IFS series 82 (government expenditure) was used. In the case of Chile,
a series of non-interest spending that was available from IFS was used.
For Israel, Malaysia, and Turkey data was obtained from their respective
central banks. Data for Denmark and France was obtained from Euro-
stat. Series were expanded using the database of Agenor, McDermott, and
Prasad. The series was normalized to 1 for 1Q2000 and then de￿ ated using
the CPI series, also normalized to 1 for 1Q2000.
Real Return on 6-month U.S. Treasury Bills
IFS series 11160C..ZF. The real Treasury yield was created by de￿ ating
the returns on U.S. Treasuries by the CPI in￿ ation rate of the previous
6-month period, using the above stated CPI series for the United States.
This is a measure of expected real return based on adaptive expectations.
Using an ex-post measure of the real return does not impact any of the
paper￿ s results. We then weigh this measure on a country-by-country basis
using the Chinn and Ito (2007) measure of ￿nancial openness, scaled to
range between zero and one.
Weighted GDP growth of Trading Partners
Following Jaimovich and Panizza (2007) we create an index of the GDP
growth of each country￿ s trading partners as the growth in real GDP (see
above) of each of the country￿ s trading partners. Trade-partner growth was
weighted by the share of the country￿ s total exports to each of its trading
partners (taken from the IMF￿ s DOTS database). Finally, each country￿ s
weighted-trade-partner growth was de￿ ated by the country￿ s average ratio
of exports to GDP over the entire period. This last statistic was created
using annual data, with exports (total, to rest of the world) taken from the
DOTS database, and nominal GDP in USD taken from the IMF￿ s World
Economic Outlook database.
Terms of Trade
IFS series 74 (unit price of exports) divided by series 75 (unit price of
imports).
31Developing Countries High-Income Countries
Government 
Spending
0.51 ***                                
(0.13)




0.48 ***                                
(0.06)
0.11 ***                         
(0.03)
n (Spend.) 1286 852
n (Consum.) 1598 1946
Standard Errors in parenthesis
* - Significant at 90%
** - Significant at 95%
*** - Significant at 99%
Table 1: Stylized Facts
Dependent Variable: Change in Log Real Government Spending Variable
Independent Variable: Change in Log Real GDP
 Developing Countries High-Income Countries
Government 
Spending
0.93 ***                            
(0.05)




0.31 ***                                    
(0.14)





1.31 ***                                    
(0.14)




-0.07                                    
(0.28)
-0.09                            
(0.30)
n (Expend.) 3139 754
n (Consum.) 2945 789
n (Interest) 1178 509
Cluster-Robust Standard Errors in parenthesis
* - Significant at 90%
** - Significant at 95%
*** - Significant at 99%
Annual Data
Table 2: Cyclicality of Government Spending--Composition
Dependent Variable: Change in Log Real Government Spending Variable
Independent Variable: Change in Log Real GDP
   Developing Countries High-Income Countries
OLS
0.48 ***                                
(0.06)
0.11 ***                         
(0.03)
IV 
0.39                                 
(0.31)                          
[4.36]
-0.13                                 
(0.15)                                          
[10.06]
n 1290 1570
Standard Errors in parenthesis, F-statistics of first stage regressions in square brackets
The critical value for the Stock and Yogo (2002) test for weeks instruments is an F-statistic of
11.59
* - Significant at 90%
** - Significant at 95%
*** - Significant at 99%
Table 3: OLS and IV Estimates
Dependent Variable: Change in Real Government Consumption
Instrumented Variable: Change in Real GDP
Instruments: 4 lags of Weighted GDP Growth of Trading Partners
 Developing Countries High-Income Countries
OLS
0.51 ***                                
(0.07)
0.17 ***                         
(0.04)
GMM
0.61 **                            
(0.24)                          
[5.36]
-0.11                                 
(0.12)                                          
[9.48]
n 1290 1570
Standard Errors in parenthesis, F-statistics of first stage regressions in square brackets
The critical value for the Stock and Yogo (2002) test for weeks instruments is an F-statistic of
11.59
Standard Errors in parenthesis
* - Significant at 90%
** - Significant at 95%
*** - Significant at 99%
Table 4: GMM Estimates
Dependent Variable--Change in Log Real Government Consumption
Instrumented Variable: Change in Real GDP
Instruments: 4 lags of Weighted GDP Growth of Trading Partners and 
of the Real Interest Rate on 6-month U.S. Treasuries
 Developing Countries High-Income Countries
GDP (-1)
0.38 ***                                
(0.03)
0.53 ***                         
(0.02)
n 1608 1947
Developing Countries High-Income Countries
Government 
Consumption
0.05 ***                             
(.01)
0.01                              
(0.01)
GDP(-1)
0.87 ***                             
(0.01)
0.93 ***                          
(0.01)
Standard Errors in parenthesis
* - Significant at 90%
** - Significant at 95%
*** - Significant at 99%
Equation 2: Dependent Variable--(Detrended Log) Real GDP
Independent Variables: (Detrended Logs of) Real Government Consumption 
and Real GDP (1Q lagged)
Table 5: OLS Estimates--Simultaneous Equations
Equation 1: Dependent Variable--(Detrended Log) Real Government 
Consumption
Independent Variable: (Detrended Log) Real GDP (1Q Lagged)
 Excluded Variable Bivariate Full
6.96 5.26 *
(0.14) (0.72)
35.1 *** 34.2 ***
(0.00) (0.00)
n 1517 1297
* Null rejected with 90% confidence
** Null rejected with 95% confidence
*** Null rejected with 99% confidence
Excluded Variable Bivariate Full
12.6 20.5 ***
(0.13) (0.00)
61.5 *** 42.8 ***
(0.00) (0.00)
n 1685 1374
* Null rejected with 90% confidence
** Null rejected with 95% confidence










Wald Test for Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity
Reported Chi-Squared (p-statistic in parenthesis)
 Figure 1 
Developing Countries 
Bivariate Regression with Government Consumption 
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Developing Countries 
Bivariate Regression with Government Consumption 
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High-Income Countries 
Bivariate Regression 
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Developing Countries High-Income Countries
OLS
0.45 ***                                
(0.08)
0.05                            
(0.13)
n (OLS) 1163 1514
Standard Errors in parenthesis
* - Significant at 90%
** - Significant at 95%
*** - Significant at 99%
Table A1: OLS Estimates
Dependent Variable: Change in Real Government Spending
Independent Variable: Change in Industrial Production
 Developing Countries High-Income Countries
OLS
0.93 ***                            
(0.05)
0.08                                
(0.11)
IV
-0.56                               
(0.75)
-0.74                               
(0.80)
n 1874 623
F-stat in first stage 
of IV
2.87 11.83
Standard Errors in parenthesis
* - Significant at 90%
** - Significant at 95%
*** - Significant at 99%
Instrumented Variable: Change in Real GDP
Instrument: Weighted GDP Growth of Trading Partners
Table A2: OLS and IV Estimates--Annual Data
Dependent Variable: Change in Real Government Spending
 Developing Countries High-Income Countries
OLS
0.34 ***                                
(0.09)
-0.33                            
(0.575)
IV
-0.76                                 
(0.60)
-0.97                              
(1.66)
n 1049 695
F-stat in first 
stage of IV
4.36 8.63
Standard Errors in parenthesis
* - Significant at 90%
** - Significant at 95%
*** - Significant at 99%
Table A3: OLS and IV Estimates
Dependent Variable: Change in Real Government Spending
Instrumented Variable: Change in Real GDP
Instruments: 4 lags of Weighted GDP Growth of Trading Partners
 Developing Countries High-Income Countries
OLS
0.93 ***                            
(0.05)
0.08                                
(0.11)
IV
1.03 **                               
(0.47)
0.23                                 
(0.19)
n (OLS) 3139 754
n (IV) 3114 752
F-stat in first stage 
of IV
179.4 163.69
Standard Errors in parenthesis
* - Significant at 90%
** - Significant at 95%
*** - Significant at 99%
Instrumented Variable: Change in Real GDP
Instrument: Lagged real GDP growth
Table A4: OLS and IV Estimates--Annual Data
Dependent Variable: Change in Real Government Spending
 Developing Countries High-Income Countries
0.51 *                                
(0.28)                          
[5.36]
-0.05                                 
(0.46)                                          
[9.48]
n 1598 1562
Standard Errors in parenthesis, F-statistics of first stage regressions in square brackets
The critical value for the Stock and Yogo (2002) test for weeks instruments is an F-statistic of
11.59
Standard Errors in parenthesis
* - Significant at 90%
** - Significant at 95%
*** - Significant at 99%
Table A5: 2SLS Estimates with Both Instruments
Dependent Variable: Change in Real Government Consumption
Instrumented Variable: Change in Real GDP
Instruments: 4 lags of Weighted GDP Growth of Trading Partners, of 
the Real Interest Rates on 6-month U.S. Treasuries.
 Developing Countries High-Income Countries
OLS
0.34 ***                                    
(0.10)
0.63 ***                           
(0.08)
GMM
-1.71                                
(1.35)
-1.09 **                                 
(0.36)
n 1866 600
Standard Errors in parenthesis
* - Significant at 90%
** - Significant at 95%
*** - Significant at 99%
Table A6: GMM Estimates--Annual Data
Dependent Variable--Change in Log Real Government Consumption
Instrumented Variable: Change in Real GDP
Instruments: Weighted GDP Growth of Trading Partners and the Real 
Interest Rate on 6-month U.S. Treasuries






































Slovak Republic 95Q1 06Q4
Slovenia 95Q1 06Q3







United Kingdom 60Q1 06Q4
United States 60Q1 06Q4
Venezuela 97Q1 04Q4
Table A7: Length of Time Series by Country
For Real GDP and Government Consumption Series
 Figure A1 
Developing Countries 
Bivariate Regression with Government Spending 
Response of Real GDP to Shocks 
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Developing Countries 
Bivariate Regression with Government Spending 
Response of Real Government Spending to Shocks 
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Developing Countries 
Bivariate Regression with Government Spending 
Response of Real GDP to Shocks 
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Developing Countries 
Bivariate Regression with Government Spending 
Response of Real Government Spending to Shocks 
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Developing Countries 
Full Specification 
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Developing Countries 
Full Specification 
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High-Income Countries 
Bivariate Regression with Government Spending 
Response of Real GDP to Shocks 
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High-Income Countries 
Bivariate Regression with Government Spending 
Response of Real Government Spending to Shocks 
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High-Income Countries 
Bivariate Regression with Government Spending 
Response of Real GDP to Shocks 
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High-Income Countries 
Bivariate Regression with Government Spending 
Response of Real Government Spending to Shocks 
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High-Income Countries 
Full Specification 
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High-Income Countries 
Full Specification 
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